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Abstract—Synchronization of pulse-coupled oscillators (PCOs)
has gained significant attention recently due to increased ap-
plications in sensor networks and wireless communications.
Given the distributed and unattended nature of wireless sensor
networks, it is imperative to enhance the resilience of pulse-based
synchronization against malicious attacks. However, most existing
results on resilient PCO synchronization are obtained for all-
to-all networks. We propose a new pulse-based synchronization
mechanism to improve the resilience of PCO synchronization that
is applicable under general connected topologies. Under the pro-
posed synchronization mechanism, we rigorously characterize the
condition for stealthy Byzantine attacks and prove that perfect
synchronization of legitimate oscillators can be guaranteed in the
presence of multiple stealthy Byzantine attackers, irrespective of
whether the attackers collude with each other or not. The new
mechanism can guarantee resilient synchronization even when
the initial phases of legitimate oscillators are widely distributed
in a half circle, which is in distinct difference from most existing
attack-resilient synchronization algorithms (including the seminal
paper from Lamport and Melliar-Smith [1]) that require a priori
(almost) synchronization among legitimate oscillators. Numerical
simulation results are given to confirm the theoretical results.
Index Terms—Synchronization, Pulse-Coupled Oscillators,
General Connected Topologies, Stealthy Byzantine Attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Inspired by flashing fireflies and contracting cardiac cells,
pulse-based synchronization is attracting increased attention
in sensor networks and wireless communications [2]–[5]. By
exchanging simple and identical messages (so-called pulses),
pulse-based synchronization incurs much less energy con-
sumption and communication overhead compared with con-
ventional packet-based synchronization approaches [6]. These
inherent advantages make pulse-based synchronization ex-
tremely appealing for event coordination and clock synchro-
nization in various networks [7]–[11]. In the past decade,
plenty of results have been reported on pulse-based synchro-
nization. For example, by optimizing the interaction function,
i.e., phase response function, the synchronization speed of
pulse-coupled oscillators (PCOs) is maximized in [12]; with
a judiciously-added refractory period in the phase response
function, the energy consumption of PCO synchronization is
reduced in [13]–[15]; [16]–[18] show that PCOs can achieve
synchronization under a general coupling topology even when
their initial phases are randomly distributed in the entire
oscillation period. Recently, synchronization of PCOs in the
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presence of time-delays and unreliable links is also discussed
[19], [20]. Other relevant results include [21]–[29].
However, the above results are obtained under the as-
sumption that all oscillators behave correctly with no nodes
compromised by malicious attackers. Due to the distributed
and unattended nature, wireless sensor nodes are extremely
vulnerable to attacks, making it imperative to study synchro-
nization in the presence of attacks. Although plenty of dis-
cussions exist for conventional packet-based synchronization,
e.g., [1], [30]–[35], results are very sparse on the attack-
resilience of pulse-based synchronization. In [36], the authors
showed that pulse-based synchronization is more robust than
its packet-based counterpart in the presence of a faulty node.
In [37], a new phase response function was proposed to
improve the precision of pulse-based synchronization against
non-persistent random attacks. The authors in [38] considered
pulse-based synchronization in the presence of faulty nodes
which fire periodically ignoring neighboring nodes’ influence.
However, none of the above results address phase synchro-
nization of PCOs when compromised nodes act maliciously
to corrupt synchronization by applying disturbing pulses with
judiciously-crafted patterns. Furthermore, the above results
only apply to a priori synchronized PCOs, i.e., all legitimate
nodes are required to have identical phases when faulty pulses
are emitted.
In this paper, we present a new pulse-based synchronization
strategy for general connected PCOs that can achieve phase
synchronization even in the presence of multiple stealthy
Byzantine attackers. Throughout this paper, we use “general
connected” to describe undirected graphs in which there exists
a (multi-hop) path between any pair of nodes. In the pulse-
based interaction framework where exchanged messages are
identical and content-free, Byzantine attacks mean compro-
mised nodes injecting pulses using judiciously crafted patterns
to disturb the synchronization process. So compared with
existing results in [36]–[38] which address faulty PCO nodes
with random or periodic pulse emitting patterns, the situation
considered in this paper is more difficult to deal with due to
the intelligent behavior of malicious attackers. By proposing a
new pulse-based interaction mechanism, we show that perfect
phase synchronization of legitimate oscillators can still be
guaranteed as long as their initial phases are distributed within
a half oscillation period. The approach is applicable even when
individual oscillators do not have access to the total number
of oscillators in a network. The result is in distinct difference
from our recent results in [39], [40] which can only guarantee
phase synchronization under all-to-all topologies.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows: 1) We
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2propose a new mechanism for pulse-coupled synchronization
that employs a “cut-off” algorithm to restrict the number of
pulses able to affect a receiving oscillator’s phase in any three-
quarter oscillation period, which is key to enable resilience to
attacks; 2) The “cut-off” algorithm also brings superior ro-
bustness to time-varying delays (see the numerical-simulation
based comparison with existing algorithms in the absence
of attacks in Fig. 15 and Fig. 16), making the new pulse-
coupled synchronization mechanism fundamentally different
from existing ones and important in its own even in the
absence of attacks; 3) We rigorously analyze the condition
for an attacker to stay stealthy in a general connected pulse-
coupled oscillator network, and address an attack model that
is more difficult to deal with than existing results like [39],
[40]; 4) We guarantee that the collective oscillation period is
invariant under attacks and identical to the free-running period,
which is superior to existing results (e.g., [39], [40]) that lead
to a collective oscillation period affected by attacker pulses;
5) The results are applicable to general connected topologies
whereas existing results on attack-resilience of pulse-coupled
synchronization all assume an all-to-all topology.
It is worth noting that the analysis method here is also
significantly different from the methods in [39], [40]. In [39],
[40], one can prove that the length of the containing arc will
decrease to a value no greater than (1− l) of its original value
after each round of firing, where l ∈ (0, 1] is the coupling
strength. However, in this paper, while enabling resilience to
attacks, the new interaction mechanism also leads to more
complicated dynamics, as reflected by the fact that we cannot
prove length reduction in the containing arc after each round
of firing. In fact, in the worse case, we can only prove that the
length of the containing arc will decrease to a value no greater
than (1− l/2) of its original value after every two consecutive
firing rounds.
This paper is organized as follows. Sec. II introduces a
new pulse-based synchronization mechanism. Under the new
mechanism, Sec. III presents a synchronization condition for
general connected PCOs in the absence of attacks. In Sec.
IV, we characterize the condition for an attacker to keep
stealthy, i.e., mounting attacks without being detected. In Sec.
V, we prove that synchronization of legitimate oscillators can
be guaranteed in the presence of multiple stealthy Byzantine
attackers, with and without collusion. In Sec. VI, we prove
the applicability of our approach even when the total number
of oscillators is unknown to individual oscillators. Simulation
results are presented in Sec. VII.
II. A NEW PULSE-BASED SYNCHRONIZATION
MECHANISM
Consider a network of N pulse-coupled oscillators. Each
oscillator is equipped with a phase variable. When the evolving
phase of an oscillator reaches 2pi rad, the oscillator emits a
pulse. Receiving pulses from neighboring oscillators will lead
to the adjustment of the receiving oscillator’s phase, which
can be designed to achieve a desired collective behavior such
as phase synchronization. An edge (i, j) from oscillator i to
oscillator j means that oscillator j can receive pulses from
oscillator i but not necessarily vice versa. The number of edges
entering oscillator i is called the indegree of oscillator i and is
represented as d−(i). The number of edges leaving oscillator
i is called the outdegree of oscillator i and is represented as
d+(i). The value d(i),min{d−(i),d+(i)} is called the degree
of oscillator i. The degree of a network is defined as d ,
mini=1,2,··· ,N{d(i)}.
The conventional pulse-based synchronization mechanism
is presented below:
Conventional Pulse-Based Synchronization Mechanism [38]:
1) The phase φi of oscillator i evolves from 0 to 2pi rad with
a constant speed ω = 1 rad/second.
2) Once φi reaches 2pi rad, oscillator i fires and resets its
phase to 0.
3) Whenever oscillator i receives a pulse, it instantaneously
resets its phase to:
φ+i = φi+ l×F(φi) (1)
where l ∈ (0,1] is the coupling strength and F(•) is the
phase response function (PRF) given below:
F(φ) :=
{ −φ 0≤ φ ≤ pi
2pi−φ pi < φ ≤ 2pi (2)
In the above conventional pulse-based synchronization
mechanism, every incoming pulse will trigger a jump on the
receiving oscillator’s phase, which makes it easy for attackers
to perturb the phases of legitimate oscillators and destroy their
synchronization. Moreover, one can easily get that synchro-
nization can never be maintained for general connected PCOs
under the conventional mechanism, even when the coupling
strength is set to l = 1. This is because attack pulses can always
exert nonzero phase shifts on affected legitimate oscillators
and make them deviate from unaffected ones. Due to the same
reason, existing attack resilient pulse-coupled synchronization
mechanisms in [39] and [40] for all-to-all graphs cannot be
applied to general connected graphs, either. Motivated by
these observations on the inherent vulnerability of existing
pulse-based synchronization mechanisms, we propose a new
pulse-based synchronization mechanism to improve the attack
resilience of general connected PCO networks. Our key idea to
enable attack resilience is a “cut-off” mechanism which can re-
strict the number of pulses able to affect a receiving oscillator’s
phase in any three-quarter oscillation period. The “cut-off”
mechanism only allows pulses meeting certain conditions to
affect a receiving oscillator’s phase and hence can effectively
filter out attack pulses with extremely negative effects on the
synchronization process. Noting that all pulses are identical
and content-free, so the “cut-off” mechanism is judiciously
designed based on the number of pulses an oscillator received
in the past, i.e., based on memory. This is also the reason that
we let an entire oscillation period T = 2pi seconds elapse so
that each oscillator can acquire memory.
New Pulse-Based Synchronization Mechanism (Mechanism 1):
31) The phase φi of oscillator i evolves from 0 to 2pi rad with
a constant speed ω = 1 rad/second.
2) Once φi reaches 2pi rad, oscillator i fires and resets its
phase to 0.
3) When oscillator i receives a pulse at time instant t,
it resets its phase according to (1) only when all the
following three conditions are satisfied:
a) an entire period of T = 2pi seconds has elapsed since
initiation.
b) before receiving the current pulse, oscillator i has
received at least
λi = b(d(i)−bN/2c)/4c (3)
pulses within (t−T/4, t], where d(i) is the degree of
oscillator i and b•c is the largest integer no greater than
“• .”
c) before receiving the current pulse, oscillator i has
received less than λ¯i pulses within (t−3T/4, t], where
λ¯i = d(i)−2λi (4)
Otherwise, the pulse has no effect on φi.
Fig. 1 illustrates the phase evolution of oscillator i having
degree d(i) = 9 in a network of 11 PCOs. According to (3)
and (4), we have λi = 1 and λ¯i = 7. So a pulse received
at time instant t can shift oscillator i’s phase when all the
following three conditions are met: 1) t > T ; 2) oscillator i has
received at least 1 pulse within (t−T/4, t]; and 3) oscillator
i has received less than 7 pulses within (t−3T/4, t]. Take the
scenario in Fig. 1 as an example, only the 11th and the 12th
pulses triggered phase jumps on oscillator i.
1
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Figure 1: The phase evolution of oscillator i in a network of
11 PCOs under Mechanism 1. Indexed red arrows represent
incoming pulses.
Remark 1. Following [24], [25], [28], we assume that when a
legitimate oscillator receives multiple pulses simultaneously, it
will process the incoming pulses consecutively. In other words,
no two pulses will be regarded as an aggregated pulse.
III. SYNCHRONIZATION OF GENERAL CONNECTED PCOS
IN THE ABSENCE OF ATTACKS
In this section, we will show that Mechanism 1 can guar-
antee the synchronization of general connected PCOs in the
absence of attacks.
Assuming that all oscillators’ phases rotate clockwise on
a unit circle, the containing arc of legitimate oscillators is
defined as the shortest arc on the unit circle that contains
all legitimate oscillators’ phases. The leading and terminating
points of a containing arc are defined as the starting and
ending points of the containing arc in the clockwise direction,
respectively.
Based on the definition of containing arc, we can define
phase synchronization:
Definition 1 (Phase Synchronization): A network of pulse-
coupled oscillators achieves phase synchronization if the
length of the containing arc of all legitimate oscillators con-
verges to 0 upon which all legitimate oscillators fire simulta-
neously with a fixed period T = 2pi seconds.
Remark 2. Requiring the firing period to be T = 2pi seconds
in Definition 1 is important for two reasons. First, this require-
ment guarantees that all legitimate oscillators will not have
irregular behaviors. For example, otherwise all oscillators
having fixed and constant phases 0 meets the condition of
containing arc converging to 0 but is unacceptable for pulse-
coupled oscillators. Secondly, this additional requirement on
firing period guarantees that the collective oscillation period
after synchronization is not affected by attacks. In fact, in
existing results [37]–[40], the collective firing period could
be affected by attack pulses.
We next give two important properties of general connected
PCO networks under Mechanism 1.
Lemma 1. For a general connected network of N legitimate
PCOs evolving under Mechanism 1, when the initial length
of the containing arc is less than pi rad, the length of the
containing arc is non-increasing.
Proof. Following the same line of reasoning as in Theorem
1 of [39], the containing arc’s length will change only when
an oscillator’s firing triggers a phase jump on at least one
other oscillator. We assume that oscillator i fires at time
instant ti whose pulse triggers a phase jump on at least one
other oscillator. One can easily get φi(ti) = 2pi and the phase
distribution of all the other N − 1 oscillators can only fall
within one of the following three scenarios, as depicted in
Fig. 2:
a) all the other N−1 oscillators’ phases reside in (pi,2pi];
b) all the other N−1 oscillators’ phases reside in [0,pi);
c) the other N−1 oscillators’ phases reside partially in [0,pi)
and partially in (pi,2pi].
a) b) c)02π 02π 02π
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Figure 2: Three scenarios of phase distributions of oscillators
when oscillator i fires at time instant ti.
Denoting δ (ti) as the length of the containing arc at time
instant ti, next we show that δ (ti) cannot be increased by
the firing of oscillator i in any of the aforementioned three
scenarios, i.e., δ+(ti)≤ δ (ti) always holds.
4a) When all the other N − 1 oscillators’ phases reside in
(pi,2pi] at ti, the length of the containing arc can be
expressed as
δ (ti) = 2pi− min
j∈N , j 6=i
{φ j(ti)} (5)
whereN = {1,2, · · · ,N} is the index set of all oscillators.
After the firing of oscillator i, we have φ+i (ti) = 0. Since
the PRF in (2) is non-negative on (pi,2pi], the pulse can
only trigger a forward jump or have no effect on an
oscillator with phase residing in (pi,2pi]. Hence, we have
φ+j (ti) = φ j(ti)+F(φ j(ti))≥ φ j(ti) or φ+j (ti) = φ j(ti) for
j ∈N , j 6= i. In both cases we have φ j(ti) ≤ φ+j (ti) for
j ∈N , j 6= i, which implies
min
j∈N , j 6=i
{φ j(ti)} ≤ min
j∈N , j 6=i
{φ+j (ti)} (6)
The length of the containing arc immediately after oscil-
lator i’s firing at ti becomes
δ+(ti) = 2pi− min
j∈N , j 6=i
{φ+j (ti)}+φ+i (ti)
= 2pi− min
j∈N , j 6=i
{φ+j (ti)} (7)
One can easily get δ+(ti) ≤ δ (ti) by combining (5), (6)
and (7).
b) When all the other N − 1 oscillators’ phases reside in
[0,pi) at time instant ti (note that phases 0 and 2pi are
the same point on the unit circle), noting that under
Mechanism 1, the pulse can only trigger a backward jump
or have no effect on an oscillator with phase residing in
[0, pi), one can easily get δ+(ti) ≤ δ (ti) following the
same line of reasoning as in Scenario a).
c) When the other N−1 oscillators’ phases reside partially
in (pi,2pi] and partially in [0,pi) at time instant ti, one can
easily get δ+(ti)≤ δ (ti) by combining the arguments in
Scenario a) and Scenario b).
Summarizing the above three scenarios, we get that the
length of the containing arc is non-increasing.
Based on Lemma 1, next we show that every oscillator will
fire at least once within any time interval of length 3T/2 under
Mechanism 1.
Lemma 2. For a general connected network of N legitimate
PCOs with their initial length of the containing arc less than
pi rad, every oscillator will fire at least once within any time
interval of length 3T/2 under Mechanism 1.
Proof. From Lemma 1, we know that the length of the
containing arc is non-increasing. So the phase distribution of
all oscillators at an arbitrary time instant t can only fall within
one of the following four scenarios, as illustrated in Fig. 3:
1) all oscillators’ phases reside in [0, pi];
2) oscillators’ phases reside partially in [0, pi], partially in
(pi, 2pi] and the containing arc includes phase pi;
3) all oscillators’ phases reside in (pi, 2pi];
4) oscillators’ phases reside partially in [0, pi], partially in
(pi, 2pi] and the containing arc includes phase 2pi .
Since all oscillators are legitimate, according to Mechanism
1, one can easily get that in Scenarios 1), 2) and 3), all
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Figure 3: Four possible scenarios of phase distribution at time
instant t.
oscillators will evolve towards phase 2pi rad and fire within
[t, t + T ]. In Scenario 4), given that the PRF in (2) is non-
negative on (pi,2pi], the pulse can only advance or have no
effect on the oscillators with phase residing in (pi,2pi]. Hence,
all oscillators residing in (pi,2pi] will evolve towards phase
2pi rad and fire within [t, t + T/2]. Since the length of the
containing arc is less than pi rad and non-increasing, all
oscillators reside in [0,pi] immediately after the firing of the
oscillator on the ending point of the containing arc, meaning
that the network shifts to Scenario 1). Then all oscillators will
evolve towards phase 2pi rad and fire within the following
T seconds. Therefore, we can get that in Scenario 4), every
oscillator will fire within [t, t+3T/2]. By iterating the above
argument, we know that every oscillator will fire at least once
within any time interval of length 3T/2.
Now we are in position to present the synchronization
condition in the absence of attacks:
Theorem 1. For a general connected network of N legitimate
PCOs, if the initial length of the containing arc is less than pi
rad and the degree of the PCO network satisfies d > bN/2c,
then the containing arc of all oscillators will converge to zero
under Mechanism 1.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we denote δ (t) as the length
of the containing arc at time t and set the initial time to t = 0.
According to Lemma 1, we have that the containing arc is
non-increasing and 0 ≤ δ (t) < pi for t ≥ 0. From Lemma 2,
every oscillator will fire at least once within any time interval
of length 3T/2 and hence there exists a time instant t0 > 2T at
which the ending point of the containing arc resides at phase
0. Denoting the starting point of the containing arc at this time
instant as 0≤ ε < pi , we have δ (t0) = ε . Next, we separately
discuss the 0 ≤ ε < pi/2 case and the pi/2 ≤ ε < pi case to
prove the convergence of δ (t) to 0.
02π 02π
ππ
02π
π
δ 0 δ(   )1t δ(        )1t +ε/2(   )t 
4.1 4.2 4.3
Figure 4: Phase distributions of all oscillators at different time
instants in Scenario 1.1.
Case 1 (0≤ ε < pi/2): If ε is 0, the network is synchronized.
So we only consider 0 < ε < pi/2. Noting that the ending and
starting points of the containing arc reside on phases 0 and
0 < ε < pi/2 rad at time instant t0, respectively (as depicted in
5Fig. 4.1), so after t0, all oscillators will evolve freely without
firing for exactly T − ε > 3T/4 seconds before the starting
point of the containing arc reaches phase 2pi rad at time t1 =
t0 + T − ε (as depicted in Fig. 4.2). Meanwhile, the ending
point of the containing arc resides on phase 2pi − ε rad and
we have δ (t1) = δ (t0) = ε .
Given that the PRF in (2) is non-negative on [2pi− ε, 2pi],
a pulse can only trigger a forward jump or have no effect
on an oscillator with phase residing in [2pi − ε, 2pi]. So all
oscillators will reach phase 2pi rad and fire no later than t1+ε
and within [t1, t1+ε/2], we can only have one of the following
three scenarios:
Scenario 1.1: all oscillators fired within [t1, t1+ ε/2];
Scenario 1.2: some oscillators did not fire within [t1, t1+ε/2]
but all these oscillators jumped in phase within
[t1, t1+ ε/2];
Scenario 1.3: some oscillators neither fired nor jumped in
phase within [t1, t1+ ε/2].
Next, we prove δ (t1 + ε) ≤ (1− l/2)δ (t1) in all above
three scenarios, based on which we can further prove such a
decrease of containing arc after each round of firing and hence
the convergence of δ (t) to zero. Without loss of generality, we
label all oscillators in an increasing order of their phases at
time instant t1, i.e., 2pi− ε = φ1(t1)≤ φ2(t1)≤ ·· · ≤ φN(t1) =
2pi and denote N f (respectively Nn) as the index set of
oscillators fired (respectively did not fire) in [t1, t1+ ε/2].
Scenario 1.1 (all oscillators fired within [t1, t1+ε/2]): One
can easily know that in this case N f contains all oscillators
andNn is an empty set. The phases of all oscillators at t1+ε/2
should follow the pattern depicted in Fig. 4.3.
Since the PRF in (2) is non-positive on [0, pi], the phase
evolution of an oscillator cannot be advanced by received
pulses when its phase resides in [0, pi]. So all oscillators’
phases reside in [0, ε/2] at time t1 + ε/2, which means
0 ≤ δ (t1 + ε/2) ≤ ε/2 = δ (t1)/2. Given l ∈ (0, 1], one can
obtain δ (t1 + ε/2) ≤ (1− l/2)δ (t1). According to the non-
increasing property of the containing arc in Lemma 1, we
have δ (t1+ ε)≤ (1− l/2)δ (t1).
(         ) (       )
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Figure 5: Phase distributions of all oscillators at different time
instants in Scenario 1.2 and Scenario 1.3.
Scenario 1.2 (some oscillators did not fire within [t1, t1 +
ε/2] but all these oscillators jumped in phase within [t1, t1+
ε/2]): At time instant t1 + ε/2, the phase distribution of all
oscillators should follow the pattern depicted in Fig. 5.3. The
length of the containing arc at t1+ ε/2 can be obtained as
δ (t1+ ε/2) = max
i∈N f
{φi(t1+ ε/2)}+2pi− min
j∈Nn
{φ j(t1+ ε/2)}
(8)
Following the same line of reasoning as in Scenario 1.1, one
can get φi(t1+ ε/2) ∈ [0, ε/2] for i ∈N f , i.e.,
max
i∈N f
{φi(t1+ ε/2)} ≤ ε/2 (9)
Next, we characterize min j∈Nn{φ j(t1 + ε/2)}. Since all os-
cillators in Nn jumped at least once within [t1, t1 + ε/2], we
denote tˆ j ∈ [t1, t1 + ε/2] as the time instant of oscillator j’s
first jump within [t1, t1 + ε/2]. So the phase of oscillator j
immediately before the jump at tˆ j is φ j(tˆ j) = φ j(t1)+ tˆ j− t1.
According to the PRF in (2), we have the phase of oscillator
j immediately after the jump at tˆ j as
φ+j (tˆ j) = φ j(tˆ j)+(2pi−φ j(tˆ j))l
= 2pil+(1− l)(φ j(t1)+ tˆ j− t1)
Noting that the PRF in (2) is non-negative on [2pi− ε, 2pi]
and oscillator j can be triggered to jump multiple times within
[t1, t1+ ε/2], the phase of oscillator j at t1+ ε/2 satisfies
φ j(t1+ ε/2)≥ φ+j (tˆ j)+ t1+ ε/2− tˆ j
= 2pil+(1− l)φ j(t1)+ ε/2− (tˆ j− t1)l
Using the facts φ j(t1) ∈ [2pi−ε, 2pi] and tˆ j ∈ [t1, t1+ε/2], we
have φ j(t1+ ε/2)≥ 2pi− (1− l)ε/2 for j ∈Nn, i.e.,
min
j∈Nn
{φ j(t1+ ε/2)} ≥ 2pi− (1− l)ε/2 (10)
Combining (8), (9), and (10), we have δ (t1 + ε/2) ≤
(1− l/2)δ (t1). According to the non-increasing property of
the containing arc in Lemma 1, one can obtain δ (t1 + ε) ≤
(1− l/2)δ (t1).
Scenario 1.3 (some oscillators neither fired nor jumped in
phase within [t1, t1+ε/2]): At time instant t1+ε/2, the phase
distribution of all oscillators should also follow the pattern
depicted in Fig. 5.3. To prove δ (t1 + ε) ≤ (1− l/2)δ (t1), we
first characterize the number of oscillators in N f and Nn.
We assume oscillator j′ ∈ Nn neither fired nor jumped
in phase within [t1, t1 + ε/2]. Recall that no oscillators fired
in (t0, t1) of duration t1 − t0 = T − ε > 3T/4, according to
Mechanism 1, oscillator j′ being not triggered to jump in
phase within [t1, t1+ ε/2] implies it receiving no greater than
λ j′ pulses within [t1, t1+ ε/2] of duration less than T/4, i.e.,
condition b) of Mechanism 1 is not satisfied.
As all oscillators will reach 2pi rad and fire within [t1, t1+ε],
every oscillator k (1 ≤ k ≤ N) should receive at least d(k)
pulses within [t1, t1+ ε]. Since oscillator j′ was not triggered
to jump and hence received no greater than λ j′ pulses within
[t1, t1 + ε/2], it will receive at least d( j′)− λ j′ pulses in
(t1 + ε/2, t1 + ε], i.e., the number of oscillators that did not
fire in [t1, t1 + ε/2] is at least d( j′)−λ j′ . In other words, the
number of oscillators in Nn is at least d( j′)−λ j′ . According
to the definition of λ j′ in (3), we have 4λ j′ ≤ d( j′)−bN/2c,
which further leads to d( j′) − λ j′ ≥ bN/2c + 3λ j′ . Given
λ j′ ≥ 0 and d( j′) > bN/2c, we always have d( j′)− λ j′ ≥
bN/2c+ 1. Therefore, the number of oscillators in Nn is at
least bN/2c+1 and the number of oscillators in N f is at most
N− (bN/2c+1), which is no greater than bN/2c.
Next, we characterize the phases of oscillators at t1 + ε .
Since all oscillators in Nn fired within (t1 + ε/2, t1 + ε],
6following the same line of reasoning as in Scenario 1.1, we
have
φ j(t1+ ε) ∈ [0, ε/2] (11)
for j ∈Nn.
To determine φi(t1 + ε) for i ∈ N f , we first determine
φi(t1+ ε/2) for i ∈N f . Recall that all oscillators in N f fired
within [t1, t1 + ε/2], following the same line of reasoning as
in Scenario 1.1, we have φi(t1 + ε/2) ∈ [0, ε/2] for i ∈N f .
Next, we prove that all oscillators in N f will be triggered to
jump in phase within (t1+ ε/2, t1+ ε].
As has been proven, the number of oscillators in N f is
no greater than bN/2c and all oscillators in N f fired within
[t1, t1 + ε/2]. So every oscillator i in N f can receive at most
bN/2c− 1 pulses within [t1, t1 + ε/2] (note that oscillator i
cannot receive its own pulse) and will receive at least d(i)−
(bN/2c− 1) pulses within (t1 + ε/2, t1 + ε] of duration less
than T/4. Using the definition of λi in (3), we have d(i)−
(bN/2c−1)> λi, i.e., there must exist a time instant t˜i ∈ (t1+
ε/2, t1+ε] for every oscillator i at which it receives the (λi+
1)th pulse since (but not including) time instant t1+ε/2, i.e.,
condition b) in Mechanism 1 is satisfied. Next we proceed to
prove that at t˜i, condition c) in Mechanism 1 is also satisfied
(note that condition a) is always satisfied since we start at
t0 > 2T ), and hence all oscillators in N f will be triggered to
jump in phase in (t1+ ε/2, t1+ ε].
As no oscillators fire within (t0, t1) of duration t1− t0 =
T − ε > 3T/4 and oscillator i receives at most bN/2c − 1
pulses within [t1, t1 + ε/2], we have that within (t0, t1 + ε/2]
of duration t1+ ε/2− t0 > 3T/4, oscillator i receives at most
bN/2c − 1 pulses, which is less than λ¯i − 2λi according to
(4), implying that at t˜i, condition c) of Mechanism 1 is also
satisfied. Therefore, according to Mechanism 1, the phase of
oscillator i will be triggered to jump by the pulse received at
t˜i, i.e., every oscillator i in N f will be triggered to jump in
phase within (t1+ ε/2, t1+ ε].
Now we are in position to determine the phase of oscillator
i for i ∈ N f at time instant t1 + ε . Since every oscillator
i jumped at least once within (t1 + ε/2, t1 + ε], we denote
tˆi ∈ (t1 + ε/2, t1 + ε] as the time instant of oscillator i’s first
jump within (t1 + ε/2, t1 + ε]. So the phase of oscillator i
immediately before the jump at tˆi is φi(tˆi) = φi(t1+ε/2)+ tˆi−
(t1+ε/2). According to the PRF in (2), the phase of oscillator
i immediately after the jump at tˆi can be obtained as
φ+i (tˆi) =(1− l)φi(tˆi)
=(1− l)(φi(t1+ ε/2)+ tˆi− (t1+ ε/2))
Noting that the PRF in (2) is non-positive on [0, pi] and
oscillator i can be triggered to jump multiple times within
(t1+ ε/2, t1+ ε], the phase of oscillator i at t1+ ε satisfies
φi(t1+ ε)≤ φ+i (tˆi)+(t1+ ε)− tˆi
≤ (1− l)φ j(t1+ ε/2)+ ε/2+(t1+ ε/2− tˆi)l (12)
Substituting φi(t1+ε/2)∈ [0, ε/2] and tˆi ∈ (t1+ε/2, t1+ε]
into (12) leads to φi(t1 + ε) ∈ [0, (1− l/2)ε] for i ∈ N f . In
combination with the fact φ j(t1 + ε) ∈ [0, ε/2] for j ∈Nn in
(11) and l ∈ (0, 1], we have that the phases of all oscillators
reside in [0, (1− l/2)ε] at time t1 + ε , i.e., δ (t1 + ε) ≤ (1−
l/2)δ (t1).
In summary, we have δ (t1+ε)≤ (1− l/2)δ (t1) in all three
Scenarios 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3. At t1 + ε , all oscillators reside
in [0,pi] and will evolve towards phase 2pi rad and fire. By
repeating the above analyses, we can get that the length of
the containing arc δ (t) decreases to a value no greater than
(1− l/2)δ (t) after each round of firing until it converges to
0. Therefore, synchronization can be achieved in Case 1.
Case 2 (pi/2≤ ε < pi): Similar to the reasoning in Case 1,
there exists a time instant t0 > 2T at which the ending and
starting points of the containing arc reside on phases 0 and
pi/2 ≤ ε < pi rad, respectively. After t0, all oscillators evolve
freely for exactly T−ε > T/2 seconds before the starting point
of the containing arc reaches phase 2pi rad at t1 = t0+T − ε .
At t1, the ending point of the containing arc resides on phase
2pi− ε rad and we have δ (t1) = δ (t0) = ε .
Given that the PRF in (2) is non-negative on [2pi−ε, 2pi], a
pulse can only trigger a forward jump or have no effect on an
oscillator with phase residing in [2pi−ε, 2pi]. So all oscillators
will reach phase 2pi rad and fire no later than time instant
t1+ε and within [t1, t1+ε/2], only one of the following three
scenarios can happen:
Scenario 2.1: all oscillators fired within [t1, t1+ ε/2];
Scenario 2.2: some oscillators did not fire within [t1, t1+ε/2]
but all of these oscillators jumped in phase
within [t1, t1+ ε/2];
Scenario 2.3: some oscillators neither fired nor jumped in
phase within [t1, t1+ ε/2].
Next, we show that δ (t) will decrease to less than pi/2 rad
in finite time, meaning that Case 2 will shift to Case 1 in finite
time. Therefore, δ (t) will also converge to 0 for pi/2≤ ε < pi .
Similar to Case 1, we label all oscillators in an increasing
order of their phases at t1, i.e., 2pi−ε = φ1(t1)≤ φ2(t1)≤ ·· · ≤
φN(t1) = 2pi and denote N f (respectively Nn) as the index
set of oscillators fired (respectively did not fire) in [t1, t1 +
ε/2]. Following the same line of reasoning as in Scenario
1.1 and Scenario 1.2, one can easily obtain δ (t1 + ε) ≤ (1−
l/2)δ (t1) in Scenario 2.1 and Scenario 2.2, respectively. For
Scenario 2.3, i.e., some oscillators neither fired nor jumped
in phase within [t1, t1 + ε/2], we assume oscillator j′ is such
an oscillator. According to Mechanism 1, there could be two
reasons for the not firing of oscillator j′ in [t1, t1+ ε/2]:
Scenario 2.3.1: oscillator j′ receives no greater than λ j′ pulses
within [t1, t1 + ε/2], i.e., condition b) of
Mechanism 1 is not satisfied;
Scenario 2.3.2: oscillator j′ receives over λ j′ pulses within
[t1, t1 + ε/2], but the number of pulses it
received within the past period of length
3T/4 is no less than λ¯ j′ , i.e., condition c)
of Mechanism 1 is not satisfied.
Next, we show that in both scenarios, the length of the
containing arc will keep decreasing to less than (1− l/2) of
its original value.
Scenario 2.3.1: Following the same line of reasoning as in
Scenario 1.3, all oscillators’ phases reside in [0, (1− l/2)ε] at
time instant t1+ ε , which means δ (t1+ ε)≤ (1− l/2)δ (t1).
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Figure 6: Phase distributions of all oscillators at different time
instants in Scenario 2.3.2.
Scenario 2.3.2: In this case, we cannot prove length decrease
in the containing arc by focusing on the time interval [t0, t1+ε]
(one firing round), so we extend our considered time span to
two firing rounds. Without loss of generality, we assume that
the previous firing round starts at t ′0 < t0 at which the ending
and starting points of the containing arc reside on phases 0 and
ε ′ rad, respectively (as depicted in Fig. 6.1). As the containing
arc is non-increasing (Lemma 1), we have ε ≤ δ (t ′0) = ε ′ < pi .
After t ′0, all oscillators evolve freely for exactly 2pi−ε ′ > T/2
seconds before the starting point of the containing arc reaches
phase 2pi rad at time t ′1 = t
′
0+2pi−ε ′ (as depicted in Fig. 6.2).
At t ′1, the ending point of the containing arc resides on phase
2pi− ε ′ rad and we have δ (t ′1) = δ (t ′0) = ε ′.
Given that the PRF in (2) is non-negative on [2pi−ε ′, 2pi], a
pulse can only trigger a forward jump or have no effect on an
oscillator with phase residing in [2pi−ε ′, 2pi]. So all oscillators
will reach phase 2pi rad and fire no later than t ′1 + ε
′. The
phases of all oscillators at t ′1+ε
′ should follow the pattern de-
picted in Fig. 6.5. Next, we prove δ (t ′1+ε
′)≤ (1− l/2)δ (t ′1).
To this end, we need to characterize the number of oscillators
fired within [t ′1, t
′
1+ε
′/2]. The phases of all oscillators follow
the pattern depicted in Fig. 6.3 at time instant t ′1 + ε
′/2. We
denote N ′f (respectively N
′
n ) as the index set of oscillators
fired (respectively did not fire) within [t ′1, t
′
1+ε
′/2] and analyze
the numbers of oscillators in the two sets.
Recall that in Scenario 2.3.2, condition c) of Mechanism 1
is not satisfied. So oscillator j′ should receive at least λ¯ j′−λ j′
pulses within (t1−3T/4, t1). Since no oscillators fired within
(t0, t1), the number of oscillators fired in (t1 − 3T/4, t0] is
at least λ¯ j′ − λ j′ . Next, by proving (t1 − 3T/4, t0] ⊆ (t ′1 +
ε ′/2, t ′1 + ε
′], we show that the number of oscillators fired
in (t ′1 + ε
′/2, t ′1 + ε
′] is no less than λ¯ j′ − λ j′ . As indicated
earlier, all oscillators will reach phase 2pi rad and fire no
later than t ′1+ ε
′. So we have t0 ≤ t ′1+ ε ′. On the other hand,
since the starting point of the containing arc resides on phase
pi/2≤ ε < pi at t0 and the PRF in (2) is non-positive on [0, ε],
oscillators having phase in [0, ε] will not be advanced by
incoming pulses. So it takes an oscillator at least ε time to
evolve from 0 to ε rad. Therefore, we can obtain t0− t ′1 ≥ ε .
Given ε ′ < pi = T/2 and t1 = t0+T − ε , one can get
t ′1+ ε
′/2≤ t0− ε+ ε ′/2 < t0− ε+T/4 = t1−3T/4
and hence (t1− 3T/4, t0] ⊆ (t ′1 + ε ′/2, t ′1 + ε ′], implying that
at least λ¯ j′ − λ j′ oscillators fired within (t ′1 + ε ′/2, t ′1 + ε ′].
According to the definition of λ j′ and λ¯ j′ in (3) and (4),
we have 4λ j′ ≤ d( j′)− bN/2c and λ¯ j′ − λ j′ = d( j′)− 3λ j′ ,
which further lead to d( j′)−3λ j′ ≥bN/2c+λ j′ . Given λ j′ ≥ 0
and d( j′) > bN/2c, we always have d( j′)− 3λ j′ ≥ bN/2c+
1. Therefore, the number of oscillators in N ′n is at least
bN/2c+ 1 and the number of oscillators in N ′f is at most
N− (bN/2c+1), which is no greater than bN/2c.
Based on obtained knowledge of the numbers of oscillators
in N ′f and N
′
n , respectively, we can characterize the phases
of all oscillators at time instant t ′1 + ε
′. Following the same
line of reasoning as in Scenario 1.3, one can obtain that all
oscillators’ phases reside in [0, (1− l/2)ε ′] at time instant t ′1+
ε ′, which means δ (t ′1+ε
′)≤ (1− l/2)δ (t ′1). Note that proving
such a length decrease of the containing arc requires a careful
characterization of phase evolution starting from t ′0 to t1 +
ε , which spans two consecutive firing rounds. After t1 + ε ,
the phase evolution could follow Scenario 2.1, Scenario 2.2,
Scenario 2.3.1 (in which we can prove such (1− l/2) length
decrease after each round of firing) or Scenario 2.3.2 (in which
we can prove such (1− l/2) length decrease after every two
consecutive firing rounds).
In summary, we can prove that the length of the containing
arc will reduce to (1− l/2) of its original value after every
firing round in Scenarios 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3.1, whereas in
Scenario 2.3.2, we can prove such a decrease after every two
consecutive firing rounds. Since every oscillator will fire at
least once within any time interval of length 3T/2 according
to Lemma 2, we can get that the length of the containing arc
δ (t) will decrease to a value less than pi/2 rad within finite
time (in fact, after at most 2m firing rounds with m satisfying
(1− l/2)mδ (t0)< pi/2). And then, the containing arc will keep
decreasing to 0 following the derivations in Case 1.
By combining Case 1 and Case 2, one can obtain that δ (t)
will always converge to 0 under the conditions of Theorem
1.
Corollary 1. Under conditions in Theorem 1, Mechanism 1
guarantees that all oscillators synchronize with an oscillation
period T = 2pi seconds in the absence of attacks.
Proof. The result can be easily obtained from the reasoning
in the proof of Theorem 1 and hence is omitted.
Remark 3. Besides enabling attack resilience, Mechanism
1 also has better robustness against time-varying delays.
For example, numerical simulations in Fig. 15 and Fig. 16
show that Mechanism 1 has much smaller synchronization
errors compared with synchronization mechanisms in [37]–
[39] when the communication is subject to random time-
varying delays.
IV. STEALTHY BYZANTINE ATTACKS AND ATTACK
DETECTION MECHANISM
The concept of Byzantine attacks stems from the Byzantine
generals problem [41]. It was used to describe a traitor
commander who sends or relays fake information to other
commanders to avoid the loyal ones from reaching agreement
[30]. In the case of PCO synchronization, a node compromised
8by Byzantine attacks can emit malicious pulses at arbitrary
time instants. However, given that the purpose of Byzantine
attacks is to delay or damage the synchronization of legitimate
oscillators, we assume that a compromised oscillator sends ma-
licious pulses only when such pulses can negatively affect the
synchronization process of legitimate oscillators, i.e., enlarge
the containing arc of affected legitimate oscillators.
A compromised node decides the timing of its malicious
pulses based on information of other oscillator’s phases that
it can perceive from received pulses. Given that in a general
connected PCO network, an oscillator can only receive pulses
from its neighbors, a compromised oscillator can only perceive
phase information of nodes that it can receive pulses from and
decide its optimal attacking strategy accordingly.
We consider two types of attacks, non-colluding attacks
and colluding attacks. In non-colluding attacks, an attacker
determines its attacking strategy based on its own neighbors’
phase information. In colluding attacks, two attackers can
share perceived phase information about each other’s neigh-
bors, which is equivalent to expanding the neighbor sets of
both attackers to the union of their neighbor sets. The same
concept can be extended to three or more colluding attackers.
Now we proceed to discuss the attacking strategy. If an
attacker keeps sending pulses continuously without rest, it
can effectively prevent legitimate oscillators from reaching
synchronization. However, such attacks are not energy efficient
and will also render themselves easily detectable, just as
jamming of communication channels being easy to detect,
isolate, and remove [42]. Therefore, we are only interested in
“stealthy” Byzantine attacks, in which attack pulses are emit-
ted in a way that cannot be detected by legitimate oscillators
in the pulse-based interaction framework.
In PCO networks, since all exchanged pulses are identical
without embedded content such as source or destination infor-
mation, conventional content-checking based attack-detection
mechanisms such as [1] are inapplicable. We propose to
let each oscillator detect potential attacks by monitoring the
number of pulses it receives within a certain time interval. The
basic rationale is as follows: In a given time interval, if the
number of received pulses is greater than the maximally possi-
ble number of pulses emitted by all legitimate oscillators, then
it is safe to conclude that an attacker is present who injected
the superfluous pulses. To this end, we first characterize the
number of pulses that an oscillator can receive within a certain
time interval in the absence of attacks.
Lemma 3. For a general connected network of N legitimate
PCOs, under Mechanism 1, an oscillator i can receive at most
d−(i) pulses within any time interval [t, t + T/2] for t ≥ 0
where d−(i) is the indegree of oscillator i.
Proof. Noting that the number of edges entering oscillator i
is d−(i) in the considered general connected PCO network,
Lemma 3 can be obtained following the same line of reasoning
as in Theorem 3 of [39].
Based on Lemma 3, we have, under the pulse-number based
detection mechanism, that oscillator i’s receiving more than
d−(i) pulses within an arbitrary time interval [t, t +T/2] im-
plies the presence of attackers among its neighbors. Therefore,
to keep stealthy, one compromised oscillator should launch
stealthy attacks by sending pulses with a time separation over
T/2 seconds.
From the above analysis, we summarize the attacking mod-
els as follows:
In non-colluding attacks, a Byzantine attacker emits an
attack pulse only when the pulse can enlarge the containing arc
of its neighbors. In addition, to keep stealthy, every individual
attacker sends malicious pulses with a time separation over
T/2 seconds.
In colluding attacks, a Byzantine attacker emits an attack
pulse either when the pulse can enlarge the containing arc of
the union set of colluding attackers’ neighbor sets, or when
the pulse can help other attack pulse to do so.
V. SYNCHRONIZATION OF PCO NETWORKS UNDER
STEALTHY BYZANTINE ATTACKS
In this section, we address the synchronization of general
connected PCO networks in the presence of stealthy Byzantine
attacks. Among N PCOs, we assume that M are compromised
and act as stealthy Byzantine attackers. We first show that
the proposed pulse-based synchronization mechanism (Mech-
anism 1) can synchronize legitimate oscillators when attackers
do not collude, i.e., every attacker determines its attacking
strategy based on its own neighbors’ phase information. Then
we further prove that all legitimate oscillators can still be
synchronized even when attackers collude with each other, i.e.,
attackers can exchange phase information of their neighbors.
To this end, we first analyze the phase evolution of legitimate
oscillators in the presence of non-colluding attackers.
Lemma 4. For a general connected network of N PCOs,
within which M ≤ 2×b(d−bN/2c)/4c oscillators are com-
promised non-colluding attackers launching attacks following
the stealthy Byzantine attack model in Section IV, if the initial
length of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators is less
than pi and d > bN/2c, then under Mechanism 1, the N−M
legitimate oscillators encounter attack pulses only when their
phases reside partially in [0, pi), partially in (pi,2pi] with phase
2pi belonging to the containing arc.
Proof. According to Mechanism 1, all legitimate oscillators
will evolve freely for an entire period T = 2pi . Since the
initial length of the containing arc is assumed to be less than
pi , the possible phase distribution of all legitimate oscillators
immediately after the initial period of free evolution can only
fall within one of the following four scenarios, as depicted in
Fig. 3:
I) all legitimate oscillators’ phases reside in [0, pi];
II) legitimate oscillators’ phases reside partially in (0, pi],
partially in (pi, 2pi] with phase pi belonging to the con-
taining arc;
III) all legitimate oscillators’ phases reside in (pi, 2pi];
IV) legitimate oscillators’ phases reside partially in [0, pi),
partially in (pi, 2pi] with phase 2pi belonging to the
containing arc.
Since in non-colluding attacks, an attacker will emit an
attack pulse only when the pulse can enlarge the containing
9arc of its legitimate neighbors, every attack pulse will trigger
a phase shift on at least one legitimate oscillator. Next, we
prove that an attacker can trigger a legitimate oscillator (say
oscillator j) to jump in phase only under Scenario IV).
I) All legitimate oscillators’ phases reside in [0, pi]. Without
loss of generality, we assume that legitimate oscillator k
fires last among all legitimate oscillators at time instant
tk. One can easily get that all legitimate oscillators fired
in the past T/2 seconds prior to tk. Recalling d ,
mini=1,2,··· ,N{d(i)}, we have M ≤ 2×b(d−bN/2c)/4c ≤
2×b(d(i)−bN/2c)/4c = 2λi. Hence, immediately after
the firing of oscillator k, legitimate oscillator i has re-
ceived at least d(i)−M ≥ λ¯i legitimate pulses during
[tk − T/2, tk] for i ∈ NL where NL is the index set of
all legitimate oscillators. According to Mechanism 1, if
legitimate oscillator i received no less than λ¯i pulses
within the past 3T/4, no pulse can trigger oscillator i
to jump in phase. Hence, immediately after the firing
of legitimate oscillator k, all legitimate oscillators will
evolve freely for T/4 and no pulses can trigger a le-
gitimate oscillator to jump in phase within this period.
After this quarter period, legitimate oscillators will not
emit pulses before the network shifts to Scenario II) and
the number of attacker pulses is not enough to trigger
a legitimate oscillator to jump in phase. Given that an
attacker sends pulses only when the containing arc of its
legitimate neighbors can be enlarged, no attack pulse will
be emitted in this scenario.
II) Legitimate oscillators’ phases reside partially in (0, pi],
partially in (pi, 2pi] with phase pi belonging to the con-
taining arc. Following the same line of reasoning as in
Scenario I), one can get that no legitimate oscillators
reach phase 2pi and fire in this scenario. Because no attack
pulse can shift the phase of a legitimate oscillator, no
attacker will emit attack pulses in this scenario.
III) All legitimate oscillators’ phases reside in (pi, 2pi]. One
can get that no legitimate oscillators fire in the past T/4.
Since the number of attacker pulses is not enough to
trigger a legitimate oscillator to jump in phase, no attacker
will emit attack pulses in this scenario.
IV) Legitimate oscillators’ phases reside partially in [0, pi),
partially in (pi, 2pi] with phase 2pi belonging to the
containing arc. One can get that a portion of legitimate
oscillators fired in the past T/4 in this scenario. So an
attacker may be able to emit an attack pulse at a right time
instant to trigger legitimate neighbors to jump in phase
and enlarge the containing arc of its legitimate neighbors.
By iterating the above analysis, we can get that an attacker
will emit an attack pulse to shift the phase of a legitimate
oscillator only when legitimate oscillators’ phases reside par-
tially in [0,pi), partially in (pi,2pi] with phase 2pi rad belonging
to the containing arc.
Next, we establish the synchronization condition for general
connected PCO networks in the presence of non-colluding
stealthy Byzantine attackers.
Theorem 2. For a general connected network of N PCOs,
within which M≤ 2×b(d−bN/2c)/4c oscillators are compro-
mised non-colluding attackers launching attacks following the
stealthy Byzantine attack model in Sec IV, if the initial length
of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators is less than
pi rad and d > bN/2c, then the containing arc of legitimate
oscillators will converge to zero under Mechanism 1.
Proof. We divide the proof into two parts. In Part I, we prove
that the length of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators
is non-increasing. In Part II, we prove that it converges to 0.
Part I (The length of the containing arc of legitimate
oscillators is non-increasing): It can be easily inferred that the
length of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators remains
unchanged if no legitimate oscillators jump in phase. So we
only consider the case where a pulse (from either a legitimate
oscillator or an attacker) triggers a phase jump on a legitimate
oscillator.
As no legitimate oscillators will be triggered to jump in
phase in the first free-running period, we only consider pulses
sent after t = T . We will show that for any pulse sent at ti > T ,
the length of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators is non-
increasing.
When the pulse is from a legitimate oscillator i, we have
φi(ti) = 2pi , i.e., at ti the containing arc of legitimate oscillators
includes phase 2pi rad. Following the same line of reasoning
as in Lemma 1, one can obtain that the pulse cannot increase
the length of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators.
When the pulse is from an attacker, according to Lemma
4, the pulse can only be sent when legitimate oscillators’
phases reside partially in [0,pi), partially in (pi,2pi] with phase
2pi rad belonging to the containing arc. Following the same
line of reasoning as in Scenario c) of Lemma 1, one can
obtain that the length of the containing arc of all legitimate
oscillators cannot be increased by the attack pulse, although
the containing arc of a subset of legitimate oscillators (an
attacker’s neighbor set) will be enlarged, as confirmed later in
the numerical simulations in Fig. 9. Hence, we can conclude
that the length of the containing arc of all legitimate oscillators
is non-increasing.
Part II (The length of the containing arc of legitimate os-
cillators converges to 0): First, we prove that every legitimate
oscillator will fire at least once within any time interval of
length 3T/2. According to the argument in Lemma 4, attack
pulses will only be emitted when legitimate oscillators’ phases
reside partially in [0, pi), partially in (pi, 2pi] with phase 2pi
rad belonging to the containing arc. Following the same line
of reasoning as in Lemma 2, we can easily get that every
legitimate oscillator will fire at least once within any time
interval of length 3T/2.
Next, we prove that the length of the containing arc of
legitimate oscillators will decrease to 0. Without loss of
generality, we denote δ (t) as the length of the containing arc
of legitimate oscillators at t and set the initial time to t = 0.
According to the argument in Part I, we have that δ (t) is non-
increasing and 0≤ δ (t)< pi for t ≥ 0. Since every legitimate
oscillator will fire at least once within any time interval of
length 3T/2, there exists a time instant t0 > 2T at which the
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ending point of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators
resides at phase 0. Denoting the starting point of the containing
arc at t0 as 0≤ ε < pi , we have δ (t0) = ε . Next, we separately
discuss the 0 ≤ ε < pi/2 case and the pi/2 ≤ ε < pi case to
prove the convergence of δ (t) to 0.
Case I (0 ≤ ε < pi/2): If ε is 0, the network is synchro-
nized. So we only consider 0 < δ (t0) < pi/2. At time instant
t0, the ending and starting points of the containing arc of
legitimate oscillators reside on phases 0 and 0 < ε < pi/2 rad,
respectively. According to Lemma 4, attack pulses are emitted
only when legitimate oscillators’ phases reside partially in
[0, pi), partially in (pi, 2pi] with phase 2pi rad belonging to
the containing arc. So after t0, all legitimate oscillators will
evolve freely without perturbation for exactly T − ε > 3T/4
seconds before the starting point of the containing arc reaches
phase 2pi rad at time t1 = t0 +T − ε . At t1, the ending point
of the containing arc resides on phase 2pi−ε rad and we have
δ (t1) = δ (t0) = ε . Given that the PRF in (2) is non-negative
on [2pi − ε, 2pi], a pulse can only trigger a forward jump or
have no effect on a legitimate oscillator with phase residing
in [2pi− ε, 2pi]. All legitimate oscillators will reach phase 2pi
rad and fire no later than t1 + ε and within [t1, t1 + ε/2], we
can only have one of the following three scenarios:
Scenario I.1: all legitimate oscillators fired within [t1, t1 +
ε/2];
Scenario I.2: some legitimate oscillators did not fire within
[t1, t1+ε/2] but all of these legitimate oscilla-
tors jumped in phases within [t1, t1+ ε/2];
Scenario I.3: some legitimate oscillators neither fired nor
jumped in phase within [t1, t1+ ε/2].
Next, we prove δ (t1+ε)≤ (1− l/2)δ (t1) in all above three
scenarios, based on which we can further prove such a length
decrease of containing arc of legitimate oscillators after each
round of firing and hence the convergence of δ (t) to zero.
Following the same line of reasoning as in Scenarios 1.1,
1.2, and 1.3 of Theorem 1 and using the fact that the number
of attackers M is no greater than 2×b(d−bN/2c)/4c, we can
obtain δ (t1+ε)≤ (1− l/2)δ (t1) in Scenarios I.1, I.2, and I.3,
respectively. At t1+ε , all legitimate oscillators reside in [0,pi]
and will evolve towards phase 2pi rad and fire. By repeating
the above analyses, we can get that the length of the containing
arc of legitimate oscillators δ (t) will decrease to a value no
greater than (1− l/2)δ (t) after each round of firing until it
converges to 0.
Case II (pi/2≤ ε < pi): Similar to the reasoning in Case I,
there exists a time instant t0 > 2T at which the ending and
starting points of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators
reside on phases 0 and pi/2≤ ε < pi rad, respectively. After t0,
all legitimate oscillators will evolve freely for exactly T −ε >
T/2 seconds before the starting point of the containing arc
of legitimate oscillators reaches phase 2pi rad at time t1 =
t0+T −ε . At t1, the ending point of the containing arc resides
on phase 2pi−ε rad and we have δ (t1)= δ (t0)= ε . As the PRF
in (2) is non-negative on [2pi−ε, 2pi], a pulse can only trigger
a forward jump or have no effect on a legitimate oscillator
with phase in [2pi − ε, 2pi]. So all legitimate oscillators will
reach phase 2pi rad and fire no later than t1 + ε and within
[t1, t1 + ε/2], we can only have one of the following three
scenarios:
Scenario II.1: all legitimate oscillators fired within [t1, t1 +
ε/2];
Scenario II.2: some legitimate oscillators did not fire within
[t1, t1+ε/2] but all of these legitimate oscilla-
tors jumped in phase within [t1, t1+ ε/2];
Scenario II.3: some legitimate oscillators neither fired nor
jumped in phase within [t1, t1+ ε/2].
Next, we show that δ (t) will reduce to less than pi/2 rad
in finite time, i.e., Case II will shift to Case I in finite time,
after which δ (t) will convergence to zero, as ready proven in
Case I.
Following the same line of reasoning as in Scenario 2.1
and Scenario 2.2 of Theorem 1, one can obtain δ (t1 + ε) ≤
(1− l/2)δ (t1) in Scenario II.1 and Scenario II.2, respectively.
For Scenario II.3, i.e., some legitimate oscillators neither fired
nor jumped in phase within [t1, t1+ε/2], we assume legitimate
oscillator j′ is such an oscillator. According to Mechanism 1,
there could be two reasons for the not firing of oscillator j′ in
[t1, t1+ ε/2]:
Scenario II.3.1: legitimate oscillator j′ receives no greater
than λ j′ pulses within [t1, t1+ ε/2], i.e., con-
dition b) of Mechanism 1 is not satisfied;
Scenario II.3.2: legitimate oscillator j′ receives over λ j′ pulses
within [t1, t1+ε/2], but the number of pulses
it received within the past period of length
3T/4 is no less than λ¯ j′ , i.e., condition c) of
Mechanism 1 is not satisfied.
Still following the same line of reasoning as in Scenario
2.3.1 and Scenario 2.3.2 of Theorem 1 and using the fact
that the number of attackers M is no greater than 2×b(d−
bN/2c)/4c, we can obtain in Scenario II.3.1 that the length
of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators will reduce to
(1− l/2) of its original value after every firing round whereas
in Scenario II.3.2 such a reduction occurs after every two
consecutive firing rounds.
Since every legitimate oscillator will fire at least once within
any time interval of length 3T/2 according to the reasoning
at the beginning of Part II, we can get that the length of
the containing arc of legitimate oscillators δ (t) will always
decrease to a value less than pi/2 rad within finite time
(in fact, after at most 2m firing rounds with m satisfying
(1− l/2)mδ (t0) < pi/2), after which it will converge to zero
according to the argument in Case I.
By combining Case I and Case II, one can obtain that
the containing arc of legitimate oscillators δ (t) will always
converge to 0 even in the presence of attackers.
Corollary 2. Under conditions in Theorem 2, Mechanism 1
guarantees that all legitimate oscillators synchronize with an
oscillation period T = 2pi seconds even in the presence of
attacks.
Proof. According to the proof of Theorem 2, we know that
despite the presence of attacks, the containing arc of legitimate
oscillators will shrink to 0 upon which the phases of legitimate
oscillators will not be affected by attack pulses. Therefore,
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Mechanism 1 can guarantee the T = 2pi seconds oscillation
period even in the presence of attacks.
Next, we prove that Mechanism 1 can guarantee syn-
chronization of general connected PCO network even when
attackers collude with each other and exchange perceived
phase information of their neighbors. In this situation, an
attacker will emit a malicious pulse either when the pulse
can enlarge the containing arc of the union set of colluding
attackers’ neighbor sets, or when the pulse can help other
attack pulse to do so.
To facilitate the analysis, we first characterize the phase
evolution of legitimate oscillators in the presence of colluding
attackers.
Lemma 5. For a general connected network of N PCOs,
within which M ≤ b(d−bN/2c)/4c oscillators are compro-
mised colluding attackers launching attacks following the
stealthy Byzantine attack model in Section IV, if the initial
length of the containing arc is less than pi rad and d > bN/2c,
then under Mechanism 1, the N−M legitimate oscillators will
encounter attack pulses only when their phases reside partially
in [0, pi), partially in (pi, 2pi] with phase 2pi rad belonging to
the containing arc.
Proof. Similar to Lemma 4, we know that the phase distribu-
tion of legitimate oscillators after the first free-running period
can only fall within one of the four scenarios in Fig. 3.
According to the stealth Byzantine attack model in Section
IV, we know that M attackers can emit at most M attack
pulses in a quarter period. Given M ≤ b(d − bN/2c)/4c ≤
b(d(i)−bN/2c)/4c = λi for i ∈ NL where NL is the index
set of all legitimate oscillators, we know from Mechanism 1
that attacks pulses alone are not enough to trigger a legitimate
oscillator to jump in phase. Therefore, following an argument
similar to Lemma 4, we know that to enlarge the containing
arc of legitimate neighbors, attack pulses are sent only when
the phases of legitimate oscillators reside partially in [0, pi),
partially in (pi, 2pi] with phase 2pi rad belonging to the
containing arc.
Next, we establish the synchronization condition for general
connected PCO networks in the presence of colluding attack-
ers.
Theorem 3. For a general-connected network of N PCOs,
within which M ≤ b(d−bN/2c)/4c oscillators are colluding
attackers launching attacks following the stealthy Byzantine
attack model in Sec. IV, if the initial length of the containing
arc is less than pi rad and d > bN/2c, then all legitimate
oscillators can be synchronized under Mechanism 1.
Proof. Similar to the proof in Theorem 2, we divide the proof
into two parts. In Part I, we prove that the length of the
containing arc of legitimate oscillators is non-increasing. In
Part II, we prove that it will converge to 0.
Part I (The length of the containing arc of legitimate
oscillators is non-increasing): It can be easily inferred that the
length of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators remains
unchanged if no legitimate oscillators jump in phase. So we
only consider the case where a pulse (from either a legitimate
oscillator or an attacker) triggers a phase jump on a legitimate
oscillator.
Following the same line of reasoning as in Theorem 2,
one can easily get that the firing of a legitimate oscillator
cannot increase the length of the containing arc of legitimate
oscillators. By combining Lemma 1 and Lemma 5, we can
also obtain that no attacker pulses can increase the length
of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators, although the
containing arc of a subset of legitimate oscillators (the union
set of colluding attackers’ neighbor sets) may be enlarged.
Hence, we can conclude that the length of the containing arc
of all legitimate oscillators is non-increasing.
Part II (The length of the containing arc of legitimate oscil-
lators converges to 0): The proof follows the same reasoning
as in Part II of Theorem 2 and is omitted.
Remark 4. It is worth noting that the maximally allowable
number of attackers in a PCO network is 2×b(d−bN/2c)/4c
when attackers do not collude with each other, which is greater
than the maximally allowable number of compromised oscil-
lators b(d−bN/2c)/4c when attackers collude and exchange
information.
In the colluding case, some attackers can emit attack pulses
even if these pulses themselves do not enlarge the containing
arc (as long as these pulses can help other attack pulses to
enlarge the containing arc). In fact, even if all attackers are
allowed to send attack pulses when the containing arc does
not change, they still cannot prevent legitimate pulses from
satisfying condition (4) to decrease the length of the containing
arc.
Corollary 3. For a general connected network of N PCOs,
within which M ≤ b(d−bN/2c)/4c colluding attackers have
the ability to emit attack pulses not only when their pulses
can enlarge the length of the containing arc but also when the
pulses do not change the containing arc, if the initial length of
the containing arc of all legitimate oscillators is less than pi
rad and d > bN/2c, then there always exist legitimate pulses
satisfying (4) in Mechanism 1.
Proof. According the stealthy requirement in Sec. IV, M ≤
b(d−bN/2c)/4c attackers can emit at most 2M attack pulses
within an arbitrary three-quarter oscillation period. Since 2M
is less than λ¯i, one can get that (4) cannot be made unsatisfied
for all legitimate pulses.
Remark 5. Following Corollary 3 and the proof in Theorem 2,
one can get that there always exist legitimate pulses satisfying
condition (4), which will reduce the length of the containing
arc, even though attackers can ensure that all their attack
pulses do not change the length of the containing arc of
legitimate oscillators. Hence, attackers cannot prevent legiti-
mate oscillators from reaching synchronization by holding the
containing arc constant.
VI. EXTENSION TO THE CASE WHERE N IS UNKNOWN TO
INDIVIDUAL OSCILLATORS
The implementation of the “cut-off” algorithm in Mecha-
nism 1 requires each node to have access to N, which may be
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not feasible in a completely decentralized network. Therefore,
in this section, we generalize our approach to the case where N
is unknown to individual oscillators by leveraging the degree
information of individual oscillators. The essence is a new
“cut-off” mechanism that is designed based on the degree
information of individual oscillators, as detailed below:
New Pulse-Based Synchronization Mechanism (Mechanism 2):
1) The phase φi of oscillator i evolves from 0 to 2pi rad with
a constant speed ω = 1 rad/second.
2) Once φi reaches 2pi rad, oscillator i fires and resets its
phase to 0.
3) When oscillator i receives a pulse at time instant t, it
simultaneously resets its phase according to (1) only
when all the following three conditions are satisfied:
a) an entire period T = 2pi seconds has elapsed since
initiation.
b) before receiving the current pulse, oscillator i has
received at least bd(i)/9c pulses within (t − T/4, t],
where b•c is the largest integer no greater than “• .”
c) before receiving the current pulse, oscillator i has
received less than d(i)− 2× bd(i)/9c pulses within
(t−3T/4, t].
Otherwise, the pulse has no effect on φi.
Following a similar line of reasoning in Section III and
Section V, we can prove that Mechanism 2 can synchronize
legitimate oscillators both in the absence and presence of
attackers.
Corollary 4. For an attack-free general-connected network of
N PCOs, if the degree of the network satisfies d > b2N/3c
and the initial length of the containing arc is less than pi rad,
then all oscillators can be synchronized under Mechanism 2.
Proof. Proof of Corollary 4 can be obtained following Theo-
rem 1 and is omitted.
Theorem 4. For a general connected network of N PCOs,
within which M oscillators are non-colluding stealthy Byzan-
tine attackers, if M is no greater than 2×bd/9c with d >
b2N/3c, then all legitimate oscillators can be synchronized
under Mechanism 2 as long as their initial length of the
containing arc is less than pi rad.
Proof. The proof follows the same line of reasoning as in
Theorem 2. More specifically, using the same arguments
as Part I of Theorem 2, we can obtain that a pulse from
neither a legitimate oscillator nor a stealthy Byzantine attacker
could enlarge the containing arc of legitimate oscillators
under Mechanism 2, i.e, the length of the containing arc of
legitimate oscillators is non-increasing. Then, following the
same argument as in Part II of Theorem 2, we know that
if d > b2N/3c and M ≤ 2× bd/9c hold, the length of the
containing arc of legitimate oscillators will keep decreasing
until it converges to 0.
Theorem 5. For a general connected network of N PCOs,
within which M oscillators are colluding stealthy Byzantine
attackers, if M is no greater than bd/9c with d > b2N/3c,
then all legitimate oscillators can be synchronized under
Mechanism 2 as long as their initial length of the containing
arc is less than pi rad.
Proof. The proof can be obtained following the same line of
argument as in Theorem 3 and is omitted.
Remark 6. When N is unknown to individual oscillators,
d has to be over b2N/3c, which is greater than bN/2c in
the case where N is known. The increased requirement on
the connectivity of PCO networks is intuitive in that less
knowledge of a PCO network requires stronger conditions to
guarantee synchronization.
Table 1 summarizes the conditions for Mechanism 1 and
Mechanism 2 to achieve synchronization.
VII. SIMULATIONS
Consider a network of 30 PCOs distributed on a two-
dimension plane as illustrated in Fig. 7. Two oscillators in
the network can communicate with each other if and only if
their distance is no more than 50 meters. Thus, the degree of
the network is d = 24. We set the initial time to t = 0 and
chose phases of oscillators randomly from [0, pi). Hence, the
initial length of the containing arc satisfied δ (0)< pi .
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Figure 7: The deployment of the 30 oscillators used in
simulations.
A. In the Absence of Attacks
We first considered the situation without attackers. As
d > b2N/3c = 20, we know from Theorem 1 and Corollary
4 that the network will always synchronize, whether or not
N is available to individual oscillators. This was confirmed in
Fig. 8.
B. In the Presence of Stealthy Byzantine Attackers
Using the same network, we first ran simulations in the
presence of stealthy Byzantine attacks when N is known to
individual oscillators.
We assumed that 4 out of the 30 oscillators (oscillators 1,
6, 26 and 30) were compromised and acted as non-colluding
Byzantine attackers. As M = 2× b(d − bN/2c)/4c = 4, we
know from Theorem 2 that the network will synchronize.
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Table 1. Synchronization conditions of Mechanism 1 and Mechanism 2 (N denotes the total number of oscillators)
Initial containing
arc length
Degree of
network d
Need knowledge
of N
Number of attackers M
(non-colluding case)
Number of attackers M
(colluding case)
Mechanism 1 less than pi d > bN/2c Yes M ≤ 2×b(d−bN/2c)/4c M ≤ b(d−bN/2c)/4c
Mechanism 2 less than pi d > b2N/3c No M ≤ 2×bd/9cc M ≤ bd/9cc
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Figure 8: Plot (a) and (b) presented the phase evolutions of the
30 PCOs under Mechanism 1 and Mechanism 2, respectively.
The coupling strength was set to l = 0.1.
This was confirmed by numerical simulations in Fig. 9, which
showed that even under attacks the length of the containing
arc of legitimate oscillators converged to zero, despite the fact
that the containing arc of oscillator 1’s legitimate neighbors
was enlarged by these attack pulses.
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Figure 9: Phase evolution and the length of the containing arc
of 26 legitimate oscillators under Mechanism 1 in the presence
of 4 non-colluding stealthy Byzantine attackers (oscillators 1,
6, 26, 30) with attacking pulse time instants represented by
asterisks. The coupling strength was set to l = 0.1.
When the 4 attackers colluded with each other, according
to Theorem 3, the maximally allowable number of colluding
attackers is b(d − bN/2c)/4c = 2. Hence, the condition in
Theorem 3 was not satisfied. Simulation results confirmed
that legitimate oscillators indeed could not synchronize, as
illustrated in Fig. 10.
However, when we decreased the number of attackers to 2
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Figure 10: Phase evolution and the length of the containing arc
of 26 legitimate oscillators under Mechanism 1 in the presence
of 4 colluding stealthy Byzantine attackers (oscillators 1, 6,
26 and 30) with attacking pulse time instants represented by
asterisks. The coupling strength was set to l = 0.1.
(oscillators 1 and 6), all legitimate oscillators synchronized
(cf. Fig. 11), confirming the results in Theorem 3. It is
worth noting that the containing arc of attacker 1’s legitimate
neighbors were enlarged by attacker pulses, cf. Fig. 11.
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Figure 11: Phase evolution and the length of the containing arc
of 28 legitimate oscillators under Mechanism 1 in the presence
of 2 colluding stealthy Byzantine attackers (oscillators 1 and
6) with attacking pulse time instants represented by asterisks.
The coupling strength was set to l = 0.1.
We also ran simulations in the presence of stealthy Byzan-
tine attacks when N is unknown to individual oscillators. We
assumed that 4 out of the 30 oscillators (oscillators 1, 6, 18
and 26) were compromised and acted as stealthy non-colluding
Byzantine attackers. According to Theorem 4, all legitimate
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oscillators can be synchronized under Mechanism 2. This was
confirmed by numerical simulations in Fig. 12, which showed
that the length of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators
converged to zero.
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Figure 12: Phase evolution and the length of the containing arc
of 26 legitimate oscillators under Mechanism 2 in the presence
of 4 stealthy non-colluding Byzantine attackers (oscillators 1,
6, 18 and 26) with attacking pulse time instants represented
by asterisks. The coupling strength was set to l = 0.1.
When all 4 attackers colluded with each other, according to
Theorem 5, the maximally allowable number of attackers is
bd/9c= 2. Hence, the condition in Theorem 5 is not satisfied.
Simulation results confirmed that legitimate oscillators indeed
could not synchronize, as illustrated in Fig. 13.
Time
0 0.5T T 1.5T 2T 2.5T 3T 3.5T 4T 4.5T 5T 5.5T 6T 6.5T 7T
Ph
as
e
0
0.5pi
pi
1.5pi
2pi
Time
0 0.5T T 1.5T 2T 2.5T 3T 3.5T 4T 4.5T 5T 5.5T 6T 6.5T 7T
Co
nt
ai
ni
ng
 A
rc
 L
en
gt
h
0
0.5pi
pi
Figure 13: Phase evolution and the length of the containing arc
of 26 legitimate oscillators under Mechanism 2 in the presence
of 4 colluding stealthy Byzantine attackers (oscillators 1, 6, 18
and 26) with firing time instants represented by asterisks. The
coupling strength was set to l = 0.1.
However, when we reduced the number of colluding attack-
ers to 2 (oscillators 1 and 6), all legitimate oscillators achieved
synchronization (cf. Fig. 14), which confirmed Theorem 5.
C. Comparison with Existing Results
In the absence of attacks, we compared Mechanism 1 with
existing approaches in [37]–[39] under the PCO network in
Fig. 7 in the presence of time-varying delays. We assume that
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Figure 14: Phase evolution and the length of the containing arc
of 28 legitimate oscillators under Mechanism 2 in the presence
of 2 colluding stealthy Byzantine attackers (oscillators 1 and
6) with attacking pulse time instants represented by asterisks.
The coupling strength was set to l = 0.1.
the delays are randomly distributed in [0, 0.1T ]. Noting that
exact synchronization cannot be achieved in this case, similar
to [37], we evaluated the performance using synchronization
errors defined as follows:
Synchronization Error = max
i, j∈NL
{min(2pi−|φi−φ j|, |φi−φ j|)}
where NL is the index set of all legitimate oscillators.
Fig. 15 and Fig. 16 show the synchronization errors of
Mechanism 1 and approaches in [37]–[39] when the coupling
strength was set to l = 0.3 and l = 0.6, respectively. Each data
point was the average of 10,000 runs with vertical error bars
denoting standard deviations. It can be seen that our approach
renders a smaller synchronization error. It is worth noting that
Mechanism 2 also renders a smaller synchronization error than
the approaches in [37]–[39] under the same set up. However,
the results are omitted due to space limitations.
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Figure 15: Comparison of our Mechanism 1 with the ap-
proaches in [37]–[39] in terms of synchronization error in
the presence of time-varying delays uniformly distributed in
[0, 0.1T ]. The coupling strength was set to l = 0.3.
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Figure 16: Comparison of our Mechanism 1 with the ap-
proaches in [37]–[39] in terms of synchronization error in
the presence of time-varying delays uniformly distributed in
[0, 0.1T ]. The coupling strength was set to l = 0.6.
We also compared our proposed approach with existing
approaches in [37]–[39] under the PCO network in Fig. 7 in
the presence of non-colluding and colluding stealthy Byzantine
attackers, respectively.
Fig. 17 shows the synchronization errors of Mechanism
1 and approaches in [37]–[39] in the presence of 4 non-
colluding stealthy Byzantine attackers (oscillators 1, 6, 26, 30)
and Fig. 18 shows the corresponding synchronization errors
in the presence of 2 colluding stealthy Byzantine attackers
(oscillators 1 and 6). Each data point was the average of
10,000 runs with vertical error bars denoting standard devi-
ations. It can be seen that our approach can achieve perfect
synchronization whereas all existing approaches are subject to
substantial synchronization errors. It is worth noting that our
Mechanism 2 also achieved perfect synchronization under the
same set up. However, the results are omitted due to space
limitations.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Due to unique advantages over conventional packet-based
synchronization approaches in terms of simplicity, scalability,
and energy efficiency, pulse-based synchronization gained
increased attention in recent years. However, few results
are available to address the attack-resilience of pulse base
synchronization. In this paper, we propose a new pulse-based
synchronization mechanism to improve the attack-resilience of
general connected PCO networks. We rigorously prove that the
new mechanism can achieve phase synchronization of general
connected PCO networks in the presence of multiple stealthy
Byzantine attackers, irrespective of whether they are colluding
or not. Our results allow the initial phases of legitimate oscil-
lators to reside in a half oscillation period, which is in distinct
difference from most existing attack-resilience algorithms that
require a priori (almost) synchronization among legitimate
oscillators. The approach is also applicable when the total
number of oscillators is unknown to individual oscillators.
Numerical simulations confirmed the analytical results.
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Figure 17: Comparison of our Mechanism 1 with the attack
resilient approaches in [37]–[39] in terms of synchronization
error in the presence of 4 non-colluding stealthy Byzantine
attackers (oscillators 1, 6, 26, 30). The coupling strength was
set to l = 0.3.
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Figure 18: Comparison of our Mechanism 1 with the attack
resilient approaches in [37]–[39] in terms of synchronization
error in the presence of 2 colluding stealthy Byzantine attack-
ers (oscillators 1 and 6). The coupling strength was set to
l = 0.3.
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